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Rather than seeing the 
V-shaped recovery that 
might have been expected 
given the severity of the 
recent downturn, the 
nation is undergoing a 
more protracted process.
T
he Great Recession of 2008–09 was by far the most severe United 
States economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. Real gross domestic product (GDP), the most comprehensive mea-
sure of U.S. economic activity, topped out in fourth quarter 2007 and has 
yet to approach that peak. Employment totaled just below 138 million jobs 
in January 2008 and, as of July 2011, was still nearly 5 percent below its 
precrisis level.
Conventional wisdom holds that severe recessions are usually fol-
lowed by strong recoveries. This belief goes by many names. Milton 
Friedman termed it the “plucking theory” of business fluctuations, likening 
recessions to down plucks on a guitar string.1 The essential insight is that 
the harder you pluck down, the faster the string snaps back to its original 
position. In the wake of the early 1980s recession, economist Alan Blinder 
wrote about the “Joe Palooka effect” following recessions, named after the 
comic book boxer of the same name who could take a punch.2 In a series 
of papers I wrote with my colleague Nathan Balke after the 1990 recession, 
we documented this strong recovery phenomenon using time-series data 
on U.S. industrial production going back to the 19th century.3
Yet many have argued—and the facts seem to support—that we are 
not seeing the robust recovery from the most recent downturn that we 
might have expected given the recession’s severity. That is, the plucking 
theory, or bounceback effect, seems absent. Why is that? What is different 
this time that might cause a more protracted recovery?
Recessions and Recoveries
There are many ways to characterize the onset and ending of the ups and 
downs in economic activity known as the business cycle. The National   
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Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
the official arbiter of when recessions 
begin and end, maintains a chronology 
of peaks and troughs in U.S. econom-
ic activity that extends back to the 19th 
century. The NBER chronology seeks to 
identify turning points in general eco-
nomic activity rather than a transition in 
a particular economic measure. The se-
lection of the turning points is based on 
the behavior of key indicators (such as 
employment, sales, production and in-
come), with the weighting of each in-
dicator reflecting the judgment of the 
committee that determines the dates.  
An alternative method of char-
acterizing the business cycle is to 
examine the behavior of a single com-
prehensive measure of economic activ-
ity—such as GDP—and, furthermore, 
to define the cycle as movements in 
this indicator relative to some mea-
sure of its long-term trend. This is the 
approach favored by contemporary 
business-cycle theorists. 
Chart 1 shows the behavior of real 
(inflation-adjusted) GDP relative to its 
long-run trend from 1947 to second 
quarter 2011.4 When output is below 
trend, the deviations are negative. 
Note that these episodes tend to match 
up closely (albeit not perfectly) with 
NBER’s recession episodes (shown as 
shaded bars). For example, GDP was 
well below trend in every quarter of 
1958, and in the last quarter of 1960 
and the first three quarters of 1961. 
The NBER chronology notes recessions 
occurred between August 1957 and 
April 1958, and between April 1960 
and February 1961. Fourth quarter 
1982 is identified as a major downturn, 
matching the NBER’s recognition of 
November 1982 as a trough. And final-
ly, the chart confirms the most recent 
episode as a major slump.
More importantly, the chart neatly 
illustrates the V-shaped recoveries that 
follow the most severe downturns. 
We see V-shaped recoveries after sec-
ond quarter 1958, first quarter 1961, 
fourth quarter 1982 and even after first 
quarter 1975, which is not identified 
as a severe recession by this metric. 
We do not see as strong a recovery 
after the 1990 recession, although this 
was a milder downturn, as was the 
2001 recession, which does not show 
up as a recession on this chart’s GDP 
plotting.
No V-shaped recovery is apparent 
after the most recent slowdown. The 
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NOTE: Shaded bars indicate U.S. recessions.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations.
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NOTE: Shaded area is the 90 percent confidence interval for the mean.
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NBER reported the recession’s end as 
June 2009, and the chart shows that 
GDP was about 6 percent below trend 
in the second and third quarters of 
that year. Note that despite the sever-
ity of the downturn, real economic 
activity has not recovered at anything 
resembling the pace of previous 
recoveries.
This Time Is Different
Unlike all other post-World War 
II recessions, the 2008–09 episode 
was precipitated by a banking crisis. 
A number of researchers have shown 
that downturns associated with bank-
ing crises tend to be more severe, and 
furthermore, in their aftermath, output 
takes a lot longer to recover.5 In some 
cases, the crisis seems to persistently 
affect the trend rate of growth, while 
in other cases, the growth path of 
activity seems to shift down. 
Chart 2 is a summary of the aver-
age impact of financial crises on out-
put. It shows average deviation of out-
put from its trend path in a sample of 
countries that experienced banking cri-
ses from the early 1970s to 2002, along 
with a measure of the range of out-
comes (shaded area).6 During the first 
year of a banking crisis, output falls by 
about 2.5 percent on average and then 
slips further in subsequent years. The 
persistent decline in output relative to 
the precrisis trend is striking. The find-
ing that banking crises tend to have 
persistent effects on output is robust to 
alternative definitions.
How does recent U.S. experi-
ence compare? It depends to some 
extent on when we define the crisis 
start. Conventional wisdom holds 
that it began in August 2007, and the 
NBER dates the business-cycle peak 
in December 2007. Chart 3A overlays 
the recent behavior of U.S. real GDP 
relative to its precrisis trend along 
with the data plotted in Chart 2, tak-
ing 2007 as the first year of the crisis. 
Here we are just looking at annual 
GDP numbers. The numbers for 2011 
and 2012 are based on projecting 
the 2010 number forward using the 
September 2011 Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators consensus. It is striking 
how closely the path of U.S. real GDP 
trend tracks the average path of out-
put in countries that have experienced 
banking crises. In that sense, the pace 
of the recovery is more or less in line 
with what we might have expected 
based on the historical experience of 
other countries that have undergone 
similar banking calamities.
However, reasonable people 
might argue that the crisis really start-
ed in 2008, when major U.S. financial 
institutions got into serious difficulties, 
ultimately prompting major policy 
Chart 3
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NOTE: Shaded area is the 90 percent confidence interval for the mean.
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initiatives from fiscal and monetary 
authorities to help stabilize the econo-
my. Does this date change things? 
Chart 3B shows how the compari-
son is affected if we take 2008 as the 
beginning. If anything, the fit to the 
historical patterns observed elsewhere 
is better. That is, the performance of 
real GDP in the U.S. is almost exactly 
in line with what we might have 
expected based on the average experi-
ence of other countries that have gone 
through banking crises.
Why does output tend to stay 
below its precrisis trend path in the 
aftermath of recessions associated with 
banking difficulties? There is little or 
no consensus on this issue. Banking 
crises tend to have persistent effects 
on productivity, the employment rate, 
investment and the capital-labor ratio.7 
Fortunately, there is little evidence of 
a persistent impact on growth rates: 
Most countries experiencing banking 
crises tend to return to their precrisis 
rates of growth over time.
Recessions and Banking Crises
While the U.S. economy has been 
in a recovery for almost two years, the 
pace has been unusually weak by the 
country’s historical standards. Rather 
than seeing the V-shaped recovery that 
might have been expected given the 
severity of the downturn, the nation is 
undergoing a more protracted process. 
However, when viewed in a broader 
international context, the pace of the 
recovery seems to be very much in 
line with what other countries have 
experienced. The persistence of the 
output losses associated with banking 
crises should serve as additional moti-
vation—if any were needed—for pre-
venting recurrences in the future.
Wynne is a senior economist and vice president at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and director of 
its Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute.
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